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State Third-Party Interventions before 
the European Court of Human Rights: 
The “What” and “How” of Intervening
L’intervention d’États tiers devant la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme : état des lieux 
(le « quoi ») et modalité (le « comment »)
Lize R. Glas
Résumé
L es États tiers qui peuvent intervenir devant la Cour européenne des droits 
de l’homme (la Cour) sont les États parties 
à la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme (CEDH). Bien que l’intervention 
d’un État tiers puisse être un moyen pour 
les États de coopérer et de dialoguer avec la 
Cour, ces interventions n’ont reçu qu’une at-
tention limitée dans le débat concernant les 
relations entre la Cour et les États ces der-
nières années. Cet article s’intéresse unique-
ment à ces interventions, avec deux  points 
de vue. Premièrement, il dresse l’état des 
lieux des interventions (le « quoi »), et no-
tamment les catégories de cas qui ont suscité 
une intervention, le contenu des interven-
tions et les références de la Cour auxdites 
interventions basées sur les 59 cas dans les-
quels les États sont intervenus en vertu de 
l’article 36(2) CEDH. Par la suite, cet article 
donne les raisons pour lesquelles les États 
interviennent (en pratique) et pourquoi ils 
devraient intervenir (d’un point de vue nor-
matif). Des recommandations concernant 
les modalités d’une éventuelle intervention 
par les États sont données dans la dernière 
partie de l’article.
Abstract
O ne of the third  parties that can inter-vene before the European Court of 
Human Rights (Court) are the states par-
ties to the European Convention on Human 
Rights themselves (ECHR). Although state 
third-party interventions can be a way for 
the states to cooperate and to enter into a 
dialogue with the Court, these interven-
tions have received little attention in the 
debate about the relationship between the 
Court and the states of the past years. This 
article focuses solely on such interventions 
from two perspectives. It describes first the 
“what” of intervening, including the catego-
ries of cases that attract interventions, the 
content of the interventions and the Court’s 
references to the interventions, based on the 
59 cases in which states have intervened so 
far under Article  36(2) ECHR. After that, 
the article gives reasons why states do (in 
practice) intervene and why they should 
intervene (from a normative perspective). 
Recommendations as to how these interven-
tions can be stimulated are given in the final 
part of the article.
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I. Introduction1
In many legal systems, in addition to the parties to a case, a third  party can participate in the proceedings to offer “its special perspectives, arguments, or 
expertise”.2 The idea of interventions by a third party or amicus curiae (friend of 
the court), as they are often called, was developed in the US, then introduced in 
other states and has also been adopted by various international legal systems.3 
The system of human rights protection established by the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Convention; ECHR) is one such system that creates a possibil-
ity for “non- parties” to intervene.4
One “non-party” that can intervene before the European Court of Human Rights 
(Court) are the states parties to the Convention themselves, under Article 36(2) 
ECHR. In a few pages, they can sketch how the legal issue at the source of a 
complaint should be resolved or provide the Court with information. The drafters 
of one of the Convention protocols identified the “need to encourage more 
frequent interventions by […] states” as an “issue linked to the functioning of the 
control system of the Convention”.5 The Parliamentary Assembly, the CDDH and 
the Venice Commission also see such interventions, especially in cases of general 
importance, as useful additions which states should make more often.6
The aforementioned bodies make their comments about state interventions in 
passing, without analysing how states use interventions or discussing in some 
depth why more interventions are desirable. Nor have these interventions received 
much attention in academic writing, while interventions by civil society have 
been described and analysed in different contributions.7 It is also surprising that, 
although the interventions create a mechanism for direct engagement between 
the Court and the states, they have hardly been mentioned in the frequent discus-
1 All cases referred were adopted by the Strasbourg Court. This information is therefore not added to individual 
references.
2 L. Bartholomeusz, “The Amicus Curiae before International Courts and Tribunals”, Non-State Actors and Interna-
tional Law, vol. 5, no 2, 2005, pp. 209-211.
3 Ibidem; L.  Hennebel, “Le rôle des amici curiae devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, R.T.D.H., 
vol. 71, 2007, pp. 641-642; J. Harrison, “Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social 
Justice?”, in P.-M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law 
and Arbitration, Oxford, OUP, 2009, pp. 396-400.
4 Article 36 ECHR; Third-party  interventions can, for example, also be submitted to the European Committee of 
Social Rights (Rule 32 of its Rules of Procedure), the Inter- American Court of Human Rights (Article 41 of its Rules 
of Procedure) and some UN human rights treaty bodies, including the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Article 8 of Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and 
the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Rule 72(3) of its Rules of Procedure).
5 Explanatory Report to Protocol 14, § 19.
6 See note 150.
7 L. Burgogue- Larsen, “Les interventions éclairées devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ou le rôle 
stratégique des amici curiae”, in La conscience des droits – Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Paul Costa, Paris, Dalloz, 2011, 
p. 67; N. Bürli, “Amicus curiae as a Means to Reinforce the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights”, 
in S. Flogaitis, T. Zwart and J. Fraser (eds), Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 135; L. van den Eynde, “An 
Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human Rights NGOs before the European Court of Human Rights”, 
NQHR, vol. 31, no 3, 2013, p. 271.
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sions about the relationship between the Court and the states parties of the past 
few years.8
The aim of this article is, first, to describe the “what” of the interventions of 
interest, which includes quantitative findings, the categories of cases in which 
states intervene, the content of the interventions and the Court’s references 
to the interventions. Second, this article digs into the “why” of intervening, 
providing reasons why states do and should intervene. Therefore, whereas the 
first part is solely descriptive, the second part knows both descriptive and norma-
tive elements. By discussing the foregoing, the following question is answered: 
how can the practice of state interventions under Article 36(2) ECHR be described 
and why do and should states intervene?
Before addressing the “why” and “what” of intervening, the article first gives 
some background information on state third-party interventions in section  II. 
Section III explains the methodology behind the research. The what- question is 
addressed in sections  IV  – VII and the why- question in section  VIII. Section  IX 
includes some recommendations as to how state interventions can be encouraged 
in light of the reasons for intervening in section VIII.
II. Article 36(2) ECHR State Third-Party 
Interventions
The Convention, as it entered into force in 1954, did not provide for the possibility 
to intervene. In 1982, the Court created this possibility for inter alia states that are 
not a party to the proceedings in Rule 37(2) of Court.9 Protocol 11, which entered 
into force in 1998, amended the Convention to include paragraph 2 of Article 36 
ECHR which provides that the “President of the Court may, in the interest of the 
proper administration of justice, invite any High Contracting Party which is not 
a party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to 
submit written comments”.10 Under that paragraph, NGOs can for example also 
submit interventions. Additionally, states parties one of whose nationals is an 
applicant and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights have the 
right to intervene under the first and third paragraph of Article 36 ECHR respec-
tively.
The current Rules of Court clarify that leave may also be given to a state to submit 
such comments.11 Third-party interventions are therefore not just possible on invi-
8 See for references to such discussions: L. R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the 
European Convention on Human Rights System, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2016, pp. 129-133; See also CDDH, “Guaran-
teeing the Long-term Effectiveness of the Control System of the European Convention on Human Rights”, 9 April 
2003, CDDH(2003)006, Addendum final, pp. 20-29.
9 W. A. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary, Oxford, OUP, 2015, p. 2004.
10 Article 36(2) ECHR.
11 Rule 44(3)(a) of Court.
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tation. A request for leave to intervene must be “duly reasoned and submitted in 
writing in one of the official languages […] no later than twelve weeks” after the 
application has been communicated to the respondent state.12 In practice, it is 
highly unlikely that states are refused leave;13 they seem to have a de facto right to 
intervene. The granting of leave is subject to “any conditions, including time- limits” 
set by the Court.14 Since the intervener is not a party to the case,15 the Court usually 
requests it to not directly address the facts, admissibility or merits of a case.16 In 
other words, the intervention should be “detached from the case”.17 Further, the 
Court normally sets a maximum number of fifteen pages.18 Where the conditions 
are not complied with, the President “may decide to not include the comments in 
the case file”.19 When states do not fully comply, the President can ask them to 
redo their job, something that virtually never happens.20 The interventions are 
forwarded to the parties, who are entitled to file written observations in reply.21
III. Methodology
The interventions relied upon in this article were found through HUDOC with 
eight search terms, all entered on 15 June 2016.22 In spite of the different search 
terms used, it cannot be excluded that an intervention was missed; at least for 
interventions by human rights NGOs it is known “that the Court has occasionally 
‘forgotten’” to mention one.23 However, it may be the case that, when a state inter-
venes, the Court forgets to mention it less easily and that, therefore, the list of 
interventions composed for the purposes of this research is practically complete.
The descriptions of the content of the interventions in section VI are derived from 
the summaries of the interventions as presented by the Court in its rulings. The 
author depended therefore completely on the Court’s summaries.24 This means 
that the content of some interventions has remained unknown, as the Court did 
not present a summary of the interventions in eight (inadmissibility/strike out) 
decisions.25
12 Rule 44(3)(b) of Court.
13 L. Hennebel, op. cit., note 3, p. 650; D. J. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford, 
OUP, 2014, p. 153.
14 Rule 44(5) of Court.
15 See also Explanatory Report to Protocol 11, § 91.
16 D. J. Harris, op. cit., note 13, p. 154; P. Harvey, “Third Party Interventions before the ECtHR: A Rough Guide”, 
24 February 2015, blog post on Strasbourg Observers.
17 L. R. Glas, op. cit., note 8, p. 314.
18 P. Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford, OUP, 2011, p. 49.
19 Rule 44(5) of Court.
20 L. R. Glas, op. cit., note 8, p. 315.
21 Rule 44(6) of Court.
22 “37 § 2”, “61 § 3”, “Rule 44 § 2”, “Article 44 § 2”, “Article 36 § 2”, “amicus”, “third-party intervention”, “tiers interv-
enant”. Terms based on relevant (former) Convention articles and Rules of Court and inspired by L. van den Eynde, 
op. cit., note 7, p. 278.
23 Ibidem, p. 279.
24 See for an exception where the Court copy- pasted the text of the intervention in its judgment (GC), Jaloud v. the 
Netherlands, 20 November 2014 (Appl. No. 47708/08), § 121.
25 (2nd sect.), judgm. (struck out), Danell and Others v. Sweden, 17 January 2006 (Appl. No. 54695/00); (4th sect.), 
dec. (struck out), Bednarek v. Poland, 30 September 2008 (Appl. No. 32023/02); (4th sect.), dec. (struck out), Buczanski 
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IV. Quantitative Findings
The searches on HUDOC yielded 59  cases with one or more interventions. To 
come to this number, nine comparable Italian cases on the length of civil 
proceedings, with nine identical interventions by Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, have been counted as one case.26 The cases found are mostly decided by 
judgment and exceptionally by (inadmissibility or strike-out) decision. Compared 
to the number of interventions by human rights NGOs, this number is low; they 
intervened in  237  cases until  2013.27 The number is also low compared to the 
number of decisions and judgments rendered by the Court in one year. To illus-
trate, in 2015 alone, the Court delivered 823 judgments and the Chambers and 
Committees declared approximately 6,800 cases inadmissible or struck them out. 
Further, the Grand Chamber delivered 22 judgments in that year, which attracted 
only 4 relevant interventions.28
Table 1 shows the number of interventions per state. The UK is by far the most 
frequent intervener, whereas about two- thirds of the interveners only intervened 
in 1 to 3 cases. In total, 32 states intervened. 15 have therefore never intervened, 
most of which are either relatively new member states or very small states; Spain 
and Switzerland are the odd ones out in this category.
Table 1: Interventions per intervening state
Intervening state Interventions
UK 23
Italy 8
France 7
Czech Republic; Finland; Germany; Ireland; the Netherlands 6
Greece; Slovakia 5
Belgium; Cyprus; Norway; Portugal 3
Armenia; Estonia; Lithuania; Malta; Monaco; Poland; Russia; Sweden 2
Austria; Azerbaijan; Bulgaria; Denmark; Georgia; Latvia, Moldova; Romania; San Marino; 
Turkey
1
Albania; Andorra; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; Hungary; Iceland; Lichtenstein; 
Luxembourg; Montenegro; Serbia; Slovenia; Spain; Switzerland; the FYRM; Ukraine
0
v. Poland, 30  September 2008 (Appl.  No.  1836/03); (1st  sect.), dec. (struck out), Sofi v. Cyprus, 14  January 2010 
(Appl.  No.  18163/04); (3rd  sect.), dec. (struck out), Djelani Sufi, Hassan Guduud and Others v. the Netherlands and 
Greece, 20 September 2011 (Appl. No. 28631/09); (1st sect.), dec. (struck out), Barakzai, Habibi and Ali Zadeh v. the 
Netherlands and Greece, 13 December 2011 (Appl. No. 30457/09); (3rd  sect.), dec. (inadm.), Ahmed Ali v. the Neth-
erlands and Greece, 24 January 2012 (Appl. No. 26494/09); (3rd sect.), dec. (struck out), Micheal v. the Netherlands, 
11 March 2014 (Appl. No. 33229/12).
26 These have also been counted as one intervention (per state) for the numbers presented in Tables 1 and 2 and 
Graph 1. Reference will only be made to this case (GC), Cocchiarella v. Italy, 29 March 2006 (Appl. No. 64886/01); 
An intervention in the Winterwerp case of 1979 was not taken into consideration because it was made before the 
procedure was added to the Rules of Court.
27 L. van den Eynde, op. cit., note 7, p. 280.
28 Court, Annual Report 2015, p. 65.
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Table  2 gives insight into which states see how many interventions of other 
states as respondent state. The Netherlands has seen most interventions. 
24 respondent states have seen one intervention or more, three- fourths of which 
in only 1 to 3 cases. The remaining 23 states have never been a party to a case in 
which another state intervened. Again, these states are often either relatively new 
member states or small states.
Table 2: Interventions per respondent state
Respondent state Interventions
The Netherlands 10
Italy 7
France; Switzerland 6
Greece; UK 4
Belgium; Sweden 3
Austria; Cyprus; Germany; Latvia; Norway; Poland 2
Bosnia and Herzegovina; Finland; Hungary; Lithuania; Malta; Ireland; Portugal; 
Romania; Spain; Turkey
1
Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Republic; Denmark; 
Estonia; Georgia; Iceland; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg; Monaco; Montenegro; Moldova; 
Russia; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; FYRM; Ukraine
0
When combining the information in Tables 1 and 2, it becomes apparent that 10 
of the 47 states parties (indicated in italics in Table 2) have neither intervened 
nor ever seen an intervention as a party. The interventions have therefore not yet 
been relevant to about 20 percent of all states. Moreover, those who do use or see 
the phenomenon, only encounter it in few cases.
Graph  1 presents the number of cases in which states intervened per year and 
shows that states started to intervene regularly from 2002 onwards and that the 
number of interventions per year has never been more than six. The numbers do 
not seem to be clearly de- or increasing over the years. In comparison to (human 
rights) NGOs, the states started to intervene relatively “late”, since NGOs already 
started to intervene in the 1980s and already did so more frequently in the 
1990s.29
The Grand Chamber is the Court’s formation that decided the majority (34) of the 
59  cases.30 States therefore intervene relatively often in Grand Chamber cases, 
especially considering that that formation only delivers few rulings. This means 
that states intervene relatively often in important cases which inter alia raise a 
serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or 
29 L. van den Eynde, op. cit., note 7, p. 280.
30 The Italian length of proceedings cases counted as one because all GC cases.
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a serious issue of general importance.31 This finding is supported by the finding 
that they intervene the most in cases which the Court considers to be of the 
highest level of importance (Case Reports): 33 times.32 About sixty percent of the 
Grand Chamber cases found are referred cases.33 States therefore tend to inter-
vene more in referred than in relinquished cases,34 as the number of referred and 
relinquished cases is roughly equal.35
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated that interventions are rare and even 
a phenomenon that a certain proportion of the states has never encountered. 
If the states intervene, they intervene most often in the most important cases, 
especially cases that have been referred to the Grand Chamber. Further, state 
third-party interventions are mostly something of the past fourteen years.
Some tentative reasons are given for the low number of interventions as this will 
facilitate making recommendations in section IX. One reason may be that inter-
ventions simply cost time: one needs to check HUDOC for relevant communi-
cated cases and write the intervention. Although this is less time- consuming than 
defending oneself before the Court,36 states may want to prioritise the former 
nevertheless because of what is at stake and because of the (high) number of 
cases brought against them. Also, states may doubt whether intervening is worth-
31 Articles 30, 43(2) ECHR.
32 See HUDOC for a description of the levels; The Italian length of proceedings cases not counted because three of 
level Case Reports and six of importance level 1.
33 The Italian length of proceedings cases counted as one because all referred.
34 A Chamber can relinquish jurisdiction before it decides the case (Article 30 ECHR); the parties can request referral 
upon a Chamber judgment (Article 43 ECHR).
35 Court, “The General Practice Followed by the Panel of the Grand Chamber when Deciding on Requests for Referral 
[…]”, October 2011, p. 4.
36 L. Hennebel, op. cit., note 3, p. 641.
Graph 1: Number of cases in which states intervene per year (1993-2015)
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while, considering that the Court hardly refers to the interventions,37 making it 
unclear whether they are of any relevance.38 States may also doubt this because an 
intervention may be in vain when a case is struck out or declared inadmissible39 
or because the Court can simply ignore the intervener’s points.40
V. Categories Of Cases
From discussing numbers, we now move to the subject matter of cases in which 
states intervene. The author has chosen to discuss the content of the cases based 
on different categories rather than based on the Convention article at stake, 
because an article says little about the actual content of a case; the categories 
chosen are more informative. It must be noted that is not possible to categorise all 
the 56 cases neatly into categories. Nevertheless, the below categories encompass 
the great majority of cases and some cases even fall into more than one category.
A. International or EU Law
As has also been observed by others, states intervene frequently in cases “where a 
point of general public international law is being considered”.41 Such cases relate 
often to the question whether an alleged violation falls within the jurisdiction 
of the respondent state, as is required by Article  1 ECHR. A state may dispute 
this, for example, because it was implementing a Security Council resolution,42 or 
because it took part in a peace- keeping mission under the UN’s authority.43 States 
also intervened in a case on the immunity from jurisdiction of foreign heads of 
state in office44 and on the Hague Abduction Convention.45
Cases in which EU law plays an important role are mostly cases about the return 
of asylum seekers from one EU member state to another under the Dublin 
Regulation. Seven such cases were found.46 A good example in this context is 
the Bosphorus case, in which the Court formulated the presumption that an EU 
37 See section VII.
38 Cf.  J.  D.  Kearney and T.  W.  Merrill, “The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court”, UPLR, 
Vol. 148, 2000, pp. 743, 767.
39 See section VI.
40 See also L. Hodson, NGOs and the Struggle for Human Rights in Europe, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011, p. 54.
41 D. J. Harris, op. cit., note 13, p. 153.
42 (GC), Nada v. Switzerland, 12 September 2012, (Appl. No. 10593/08); Al- Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. 
Switzerland, 26 October 2013 (Appl. No. 5809/08) (referred to the GC).
43 (GC), dec. (inadm.), Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Gemany and Norway, 2  May 2007 
(Appl.  No.  71412/01), §  71; See also (GC), Markovic and Others v. Italy, 14  December 2006 (Appl.  No.  1398/03); 
(4th sect.), dec. (inadm.), Berić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 October 2007 (Appl. No. 36357/04); Jaloud, 
op. cit., note 24.
44 (GC), dec. (struck out), Association SOS Attentats and de Boery (SOS) v. France, 4 October 2006 (Appl. No. 76642/01).
45 (GC), X. v. Latvia, 26 November 2013 (Appl. No. 27853/09); See also (GC), Stoll v. Switzerland, 10 December 2007 
(Appl. No. 69698/01).
46 (GC), M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21  January 2011 (Appl.  No.  30696/09); Sufi and Guduud, op.  cit., note  25; 
Barakzai, Habibi and Ali Zadeh, op. cit., note 25; Ahmed Ali, op. cit., note 25; Micheal, op. cit., note 25; (3rd sect.), dec. 
(struck out), Abdullahi Ali v. the Netherlands, 27  May 2014 (Appl.  No.  63931/12); (GC), Tarakhel v. Switzerland, 
4 November 2014 (Appl. No. 29217/12).
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member state does not depart from the requirements of the Convention when 
it implements, without having discretion, legal obligations flowing from its EU 
membership.47 In this case, Italy and the UK intervened.
B. Shared Domestic Legal Concepts
Another category of cases is those that touches upon a legal concept that is known 
in both the respondent and the intervening state. The states, for example, have 
in common that they know absolute parliamentary immunity,48 a system of debt 
repayment49 or a law on adverse possessions.50 Different cases falling into this 
category concern criminal procedure.51
C. Sensitive Matters
Other cases that seem to attract interventions concern a sensitive matter for the 
intervening state, the respondent state and probably other states too. A case in 
point is the Lautsi  case about the question whether the presence of crucifixes 
in Italian state- school classrooms was compatible with the Convention require-
ments.52 The referred Chamber case attracted ten interventions, the highest 
number in a single case. Other sensitive matters include prohibiting denying the 
Armenian genocide,53 in vitro fertilisation,54 and same-sex marriage.55
D. Deportation
Yet another category that can be distinguished, are deportation- related cases.56 
These cases can concern, for example, the question how the rights protected in 
Article 3 (and 6) ECHR should be applied,57 or whether the exclusion of the appli-
47 (GC), Bosphorus v. Ireland, 30  June 2005 (Appl.  No.  45036/98); See also (GC), Avotiņš v. Latvia, 23  May 2016 
(Appl. No. 17502/07).
48 (2nd sect.), A. v. UK, 17 December 2002 (Appl. No. 35373/97) (final since 17 March 2003).
49 (4th sect.), Bäck v. Finland, 20 July 2004 (Appl. No. 37598/97) (final since 20 October 2004).
50 (GC), J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. UK, 30 August 2007 (Appl. No. 44302/02); See also 
(GC), Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands, 6 May 2003 (Appl. No. 39343/98); (1st sect.), TV Vest As and Rogaland Pens-
jonistparti (TV Vest As) v. Norway, 11 December 2008 (Appl. No. 21132/05) (final since 11 March 2009); (GC), Verein 
gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (No. 2), 30 June 2009 (Appl. No. 32772/02); (GC), Sindicatul “Păstorul 
cel Bun” (Sindicatul) v. Romania, 9 July 2013 (Appl. No. 2330/09).
51 See also P. Harvey, op. cit., note 16; See e.g. (GC), Kyprianou v. Cyprus, 15 December 2005 (Appl. No. 73797/01); 
(GC), Taxquet v. Belgium, 16  November 2010 (Appl.  No.  926/05); (GC) Schatschaschwili v. Germany, 15  December 
2015 (Appl. No. 9154/10).
52 (GC), Lautsi and Others v. Italy, 18 March 2011 (Appl. No. 30814/06).
53 (GC), Perinçek v. Switzerland, 15 October 2015 (Appl. No. 27510/08).
54 (GC), S.H. and Others v. Austria, 3 November 2011 (Appl. No. 57813/00).
55 (1st sect.), Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 24 June 2010 (Appl. No. 30141/04) (final since 22 November 2010); See also 
(GC), Hirst and Others v. UK (No. 2), 6 October 2005 (Appl. No. 74025/01); (GC), Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), 22 May 
2012 (Appl. No. 126/05); (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 2 July 2014 (Appl. No. 43835/11); (GC), Couderc and Hachette Fili-
pacchi Associés v. France (Couderc), 10 November 2015 (Appl. No. 40454/07).
56 (5th sect.), Ahorugeze v. Sweden, 27 October 2011 (Appl. No. 37075/09) (final since 4 June 2012).
57 (GC), Saadi v. Italy, 28  February 2008 (Appl.  No.  37201/06); (3rd  sect.), A. v. the Netherlands, 20  July 2010 
(Appl. No. 4900/06) (final since 20 October 2010); (3rd sect.), dec. (inadm.), Joesoebov v. the Netherlands, 2 November 
2010 (Appl. No. 44719/06).
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cant from the territory of one state for ten years is compatible with the rights 
protected by Article 8 ECHR.58 The Dublin cases also fall into this category.
E. Other
The intervener can also have a connection to the case, other than through one of 
the above categories. Germany for example intervened in two Polish cases on the 
possibility to appeal a decision of the Polish- German Reconciliation Foundation – 
a body established by a treaty between Poland and Germany – to not give them 
compensation for the forced labour they had carried out on territory occupied by 
Germany during World War II.59 Further, Cyprus intervened in Adalı v. Turkey. In 
this case, the applicant complained that her husband, a Turkish Cypriot, had been 
killed by the Turkish authorities and/or the authorities of the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus and that no adequate investigation into his death had been 
carried out.60
VI. Content of Interventions
The categories discussed in section V show that the states intervene because they 
have some sort of a connection to the subject matter of the case. From these cate-
gories, we move on to the content of the interventions. As was noted in the meth-
odology section, the content of eight decisions has remained unknown, because 
the Court did not summarise them. An observation that applies to all interven-
tions is that the interveners side with the respondent state, in the sense that both 
their submissions mean that the Court should not find a violation. Cyprus’ inter-
vention in  Adalı is the exception to this rule, as the intervener clearly opposed 
Turkey.61 Additionally, the interveners do not address the applicant’s arguments 
directly. In that light, the UK’s remark that it contested the applicants’ argument 
drawn from a previous judgment is exceptional.62
A. Touching on the Facts, Admissibility or Merits
As explained in section II, the Court usually requests the intervener to not address 
the facts, admissibility or merits of a case. Nevertheless, examples of interven-
tions can be found where interveners do exactly that.
Sometimes, factual information is provided on the Court’s invitation: Italy inter-
vened in three cases about Dublin returns to Italy, providing information about 
58 (GC), Üner v. the Netherlands, 18 October 2006 (Appl. No. 46410/99).
59 Bednarek, op. cit., note 25; Buczanski, op. cit., note 25.
60 (1st sect.), Adalı v. Turkey, 31 March 2005 (Appl. No. 38187/97) (final since 12 October 2005); See also Danell, 
op. cit., note 25; Sofi, op. cit., note 25; (GC), Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, 20 October 2015 (Appl. No. 35343/05).
61 Adalı, op. cit., note 60, §§ 185, 208.
62 Schalk and Kopf, op. cit., note 55, § 82; See also Armenia’s intervention in Perinçek, op. cit., note 53.
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the applicants’ situation.63 Further, the Court invited Cyprus to submit “explana-
tions and observations on Cypriot law as relevant to the case”.64 Azerbaijan too 
gave comments “mainly of a factual nature”, which helped clarify that the appli-
cant was not a citizen of Azerbaijan, as he had claimed.65
In other cases, the intervener seemed to have ignored the Court’s request to not 
comment on admissibility matters or the merits.66 To illustrate, France directly 
addressed the admissibility of the Nada case, on the implementation by Switzer-
land of United Nations counterterrorism resolutions, by proposing that the appli-
cant’s complaints should be declared inadmissible ratione personae.67 In  Adalı, 
Cyprus addressed the merits rather extensively. It inter alia argued that the inves-
tigations of the authorities into the death of the applicant’s husband had been 
inadequate.68 Armenia even commented on the character of the applicant himself 
in the Perinçek case, in which the Court decided that subjecting him to a criminal 
penalty for denying the Armenian genocide violated Article  10 ECHR (right to 
freedom of expression). Armenia called the applicant an “incorrigible genocide 
denier”.69 Moreover, the intervener qualified his statements as “no more than a 
racially motivated insult to Armenians and an invitation to Turks to believe them 
to be liars”.70
B. Giving Information
One thing about which the states give information is domestic legal concepts that 
are of relevance to the case.71 The interveners, for example, explain the rationale 
behind parliamentary sovereignty,72 how debt repayment works73 or which safe-
guards apply to trial by jury.74 They can also shed light on a relevant domestic 
judgment75 or even submit a copy thereof.76
Additionally, the interveners offer explanations as to how they think interna-
tional law should be interpreted.77 To illustrate, the UK once explained that the 
63 Abdullahi Ali, op. cit., note 46, § 5; Tarakhel, op. cit., note 46 (the Court did not make explicit that it asked Italy to 
intervene); Micheal, op. cit., note 25, § 5.
64 Avotiņš, op. cit., note 47, § 10.
65 Joesoebov, op. cit., note 57, §§ 41, 56.
66 See also P. Harvey, op. cit., note 16.
67 Nada, op. cit., note 42, § 109.
68 Adalı, op. cit., note 60, § 210.
69 Perinçek, op. cit., note 53, § 177.
70 Ibidem; See also Stoll, op.  cit., note  45, §  98; Vasiliauskas, op.  cit., note  60, §§  151, 163-2015; Couderc, op.  cit., 
note 55, § 74.
71 See also section V, B.
72 A. v. UK, op.  cit., note  48, §§  37-42, 44-45, 47-48, 50-51, 55, 57-58; See also (2nd  sect.), dec. (adm.), A. v. UK, 
5 March 2002 (Appl. No. 35373/97).
73 Bäck, op. cit., note 49, §§ 25-36.
74 Taxquet, op. cit., note 51, §§ 74-75, 77, 80; See also Kleyn, op. cit., note 50, §§ 185-189; (4th sect.), AB Kurt Keller-
mann v. Sweden, 26 October 2004 (Appl. No. 41579/98) (final since 26 January 2005), §§ 57-59; (GC), Karácsony and 
Others v. Hungary, 17 May 2016 (Appl. No. 42461/13), §§ 110-113, 115, 171.
75 S.A.S., op. cit., note 55, § 87.
76 TV Vest AS, op. cit., note 51, § 57.
77 Behrami and Saramati, op. cit., note 43, §§ 97, 100, 102, 104-107, 109, 113-119; Berić, op. cit., note 43; Al- Dulimi, 
op. cit., note 42, §§ 82, 85; Avotiņš, op. cit., note 47, § 86.
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“correct interpretation” of the international law on the immunity from jurisdic-
tion of foreign heads of state was “that they should also enjoy a general immunity 
from the civil jurisdiction of other States”.78
The information can also relate to matters other than domestic or international 
law. States, for example, point out that no consensus existed,79 that a case should 
be distinguished from another Strasbourg case,80 or what their understanding of 
Article 6 ECHR had been when ratifying the Convention.81 They also commented 
on religious prescripts (“the wearing of the full-face veil was not required by the 
Koran)”82 and historical events (“the Soviet authorities [did not intend] […] to 
destroy any of the constituent parts of Lithuanian society”).83 As noted above, 
the interveners sometimes also submit information of a factual nature.84
C. Expressing Difficulties…
The intervening states also use the interventions regularly to express difficulties. 
Some comments are backward looking because they give insight into the diffi-
culties which the intervener has experienced with a previous judgment; others 
are forward looking because they inform the Court of the difficulties a stay may 
face, should the Court find a violation or should the Grand Chamber confirm the 
Chamber’s vision upon referral.
1. With a Previous Judgment
In  A v. the Netherlands, four  states, amongst which the UK, pointed to difficul-
ties the Chahal judgment had created, for they could no longer weigh the risk of 
treatment contrary to Article  3 ECHR against the reasons for expelling some-
one.85 They therefore asked the Court to alter its case-law so that inter alia the 
threat to national security posed by a deportee could be a factor “in relation to 
the possibility and the nature of the potential ill- treatment”.86 In each other case 
falling into this category, the UK was also the intervener.87 In none of the cases, 
however, the Court indeed changed its case-law.
78 SOS, op. cit., note 44, § 26; See also Nada, op. cit., note 42, § 110; X., op. cit., note 45, § 83; Vasiliauskas, op. cit., 
note 60, § 150.
79 Schalk and Kopf, op. cit., note 55, § 46; Lautsi, op. cit., note 52, § 49; S.H., op. cit., note 54, § 73; Sindicatul, op. cit., 
note 50, §§ 118-119.
80 Jaloud, op. cit., note 24, § 125.
81 (Plenary) Ruiz Mateos v. Spain, 23 June 1993 (Appl. No. 12952/87), § 56.
82 S.A.S., op. cit., note 55, § 86.
83 Vasiliauskas, op. cit., note 60, § 148.
84 See also Ahorugeze, op. cit., note 56, §§ 83, 110-112.
85 A. v. the Netherlands, op. cit., note 57, § 125.
86 Ibidem, § 130.
87 SOS, op. cit., note 44, § 27; Saadi, op. cit., note 57, §§ 117-122; TV Vest AS, op. cit., note 50, § 55; Scoppola, op. cit., 
note 55, §§ 75-77.
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2. With a Chamber Judgment in the Same Case
More frequently than asking the Court to change previous case-law, states ask 
the Grand Chamber to overturn the Chamber judgment in the case in which they 
intervene.88 Although they do not always ask this expressly, they at least explain 
why they disagree with the Chamber. Ireland for example responded to the Cham-
ber’s finding that the applicant had not had a fair hearing in proceeding before a 
Belgian assize court, because the jury convicting him had not reasoned its deci-
sion. The intervener contended that the Chamber “had not sufficiently taken 
into account the assize court procedure as a whole and the safeguards existing 
in Belgium and other States”.89 Moreover, “[t]o require juries to give reasons for 
their decisions would alter the nature and the very essence of the system of jury 
trial as operated in Ireland”.90 The Grand Chamber explicitly mentioned in nine 
referred cases that the intervener disagreed with the Chamber (which had found 
a violation). Of these cases, the Grand Chamber did not find a violation in three 
cases, thus overruling the Chamber.91
3. If the Court Were to Find a Violation
In other cases, states want to prevent the Court from finding a violation in the 
pending case. For example, both interveners in the M.S.S. case sketched the conse-
quences of holding to account under Article 3 ECHR the state responsible for the 
asylum application prior to a transfer under the Dublin Regulation. According to 
the UK, this “was bound to slow down the whole process no end”.92 The Nether-
lands added that, to no longer assume that the receiving state would honour its 
international obligations “would be tantamount to denying the principle of inter-
State confidence on which the Dublin system was based”.93
D. Reminding the Court of…
The interventions also serve as reminders to the Court. The interveners empha-
sise other important matters than the protection of human rights, remind the 
Court of how it is supposed to function and of how the Convention should be 
interpreted.
88 See also section IV.
89 Taxquet, op. cit., note 51, § 78.
90 Ibidem, § 79; See also Couderc, op. cit., note 55, § 75; Lautsi, op. cit., note 52, §§ 47, 49; Perinçek, op. cit., note 53, 
§  177; Sindicatul, op.  cit., note  50, §§  113, 115; X., op.  cit., note  45, §§  84-86, 88-89; Kyprianou, op.  cit., note  51, 
§§ 105-108, 109-116; Stoll, op. cit., note 45, § 90.
91 The Grand Chamber did not find a violation in Stoll, op. cit., note 45; Lautsi, op. cit., note 52; Sindicatul, op. cit., 
note 50; It found a violation in Kyprianou, op. cit., note 51; Hirst, op. cit., note 55; Taxquet, op. cit., note 51; X., op. cit., 
note 45; Perinçek, op. cit., note 53; Couderc, op. cit., note 55.
92 M.S.S., op. cit., note 46, § 331.
93 Ibidem, § 330; See also Ab Kurt Kellermann, op. cit., note 74, § 59; Taxquet, op. cit., note 51, § 82; Nada, op. cit., 
note 42, § 111; Jaloud, op. cit., note 24, § 126.
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1. Other Important Matters
The intervening states do not shy from reminding the Court of the importance 
of various matters; in addition to the rights invoked by the applicant, there are 
rights of others and other concepts deserving respect, they emphasise. Addition-
ally, the interveners usually explain the rationale behind these other important 
matters, which include peace- keeping missions,94 the proper functioning of inter-
national organisations,95 and criminally prosecuting denialism.96
2. Its Task
The states also remind the Court of its task under the Convention. This often 
comes down to noting that the Courts “exercises only ‘limited control’”, because 
a wide margin of appreciation should be available to the states97 or because 
domestic authorities are “in principle better placed than an international court 
to evaluate local needs and conditions”.98 The states also remind the Court of its 
task by contrasting it with that of domestic courts. To illustrate, Poland explained 
that it was “debatable to what extent a supranational body could intervene” in 
assessing the facts of the case with a view to determining whether the reason-
able time had been exceeded and that “regard should be had […] to the discretion 
available to the domestic courts in assessing the facts and the evidence”.99
3. How to Interpret the Convention
Comparably, the states can point out to the Court how it should interpret the 
Convention. The UK, when inviting the Court to change its case-law, emphasized 
“the principle that the Convention fell to be interpreted and applied in accordance 
with international law as a whole”.100 In another case, the same state stressed that 
the margin of appreciation was wide due to the “importance of the public interest 
at stake”.101 As a last example, the Czech Republic explained to the Court how it 
should interpret certain admissibility requirements.102
94 Behrami and Saramati, op. cit., note 43, §§ 101, 108, 111, 115.
95 Ibidem, § 108; Bosphorus, op. cit., note 47, § 129; See also Markovic, op. cit., note 43, § 90; Pye, op. cit., note 50, § 50.
96 Perinçek, op. cit., note 53, § 179; See also (GC), Lobo Machado v. Portugal, 20 February 1996 (Appl. No. 15764/89), 
§ 27; Couderc, op. cit., note 55, § 74.
97 Cocchiarella, op. cit., note 27, § 59; See also Hirst, op. cit., note 56, § 55; Kyprianou, op. cit., note 52, § 105; Pye, 
op. cit., note 51, § 51; Karácsony, op. cit., note 75, §§ 114, 116.
98 A. v. UK, op. cit., note 49, § 53; See also VgT, op. cit., note 51, §§ 56, 76; Taxquet, op. cit., note 52, § 82; M.S.S., op. cit., 
note 47, § 330; Lautsi, op. cit., note 53, § 47; (2nd sect.), El Haski v. Belgium, 25 September 2012 (Appl. No. 649/08) 
(final since 18 March 2013), § 75; Sindicatul, op. cit., note 51, § 122.
99 Cocchiarella, op. cit., note 26, § 61; See also Markovic, op. cit., note 43, § 63.
100 SOS, op. cit., note 44, § 27.
101 Bosphorus, op. cit., note 47, § 132.
102 (GC), Micallef v. Malta, 15 October 2009 (Appl. No. 17056/06), §§ 43, 70; See also Üner, op. cit., note 58, § 53; 
Markovic, op. cit., note 43, § 88; TV Vest AS, op. cit., note 50, § 53; Jaloud, op. cit., note 24, § 121.
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E. Asking the Court…
In addition to reminding the Court of different matters, the interveners also ask 
it more or less directly for something. They can ask the Court to confirm a rule or 
they can ask it for guidance.
1. To Confirm Certain Matters
The UK invited the Court in an Article 3 ECHR case to confirm the existence of “of 
an ‘exclusionary rule’ on statements that had been obtained directly by torture, 
with the result that a violation of this Article should be found where the rule 
applied, irrespective of the overall fairness of the proceedings”.103 It also asked 
the Court to confirm inter alia “that the alleged torture had to be established 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’”.104 The UK’s strategy was therefore to formulate a rule 
itself and to subsequently ask the Court to confirm that rule. Comparably, France 
argued that the Nada case “provided the Court with an opportunity to transpose 
onto the member States’ actual territory the principles established in Behrami and 
Saramati, taking into account the hierarchy of international law norms and the 
various legal spheres arising therefrom”.105
2. For Guidance
One request for guidance came from the Czech Republic, which wanted to set up 
a compensatory remedy for length of civil proceedings cases. It asked the Court 
“to provide as many guidelines as possible” and demanded more information 
about inter alia the applicable criteria.106 In the same case, Poland found the Court 
“should indicate what just satisfaction consisted of” so that domestic courts could 
rely on and act in accordance with its case-law.107 The Court’s response to these 
requests is outlined in section VII.
F. Conclusions
Certain interventions are in vain in the sense that the Court declares a case inad-
missible or strikes it out, even before it reaches the part of the case to which an 
intervention is of relevance. Clearly therefore, it is not always possible to predict 
beforehand in which case it is worth the intervener’s while to intervene.
Even though the Court requests interveners to not directly address the admissi-
bility or merits of a case,108 this does happen occasionally. The Court is therefore 
103 El Haski, op. cit., note 98, § 74.
104 Ibidem.
105 Nada, op. cit., note 42, § 109; See also SOS, op. cit., note 44, § 27.
106 Cocchiarella, op. cit., note 26, §§ 60, 135.
107 Ibidem, § 136; See also Schatschaschwili, op. cit., note 51, §§ 96, 99.
108 See section II.
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not too strict on this point. It is furthermore logical that the Court sometimes 
permits an intervener to comment on the facts of a case, because it asked for that 
information itself and because the intervener may be the only one able to provide 
that information.
From the content of the interventions, it becomes apparent that the states 
frequently react to a Chamber judgment. This can also be derived from section IV, 
where it was described that the majority of the 59 cases are Grand Chamber cases, 
of which about two- thirds are referred cases. Many interventions can therefore 
be characterised as reactive to a Chamber judgment. The states therefore seem to 
be comparably less inclined to intervene when the Court has not yet dealt with a 
certain issue or when it dealt with it in a different case.
The above descriptions show why the Convention aptly uses the term “third-
party intervener” rather than “amicus curiae”. Except for the odd intervention in 
which the intervener provides information, the states are not really the Court’s 
friends, for they are often rather critical of the Court and may squarely disagree 
with its previous findings. Friends can of course be critical, but if the interveners 
must be qualified as friends, they are more adequately described as friends of the 
respondent state, with whom they share a mission: preventing that the Court 
finds a violation or tempting the Court to overturn a (Chamber) judgment.
Indeed and quite logically, the motive seeming to underpin most interventions 
is to prevent the Court from establishing that a violation has been committed. 
More than for their friend (i.e. the respondent state) however, the states probably 
intervene for themselves, because when the Court finds a violation, the inter-
vener may be found in violation of the Convention in a future case for comparable 
reasons.109 Explaining why (no) consensus exist, reminding the Court of it task or 
asking it to confirm certain matters, may eventually all be interpreted as means 
to prevent that the Court finds a violation.
When expressing disagreement with a previous judgment, the states have never 
been successful in the sense that the Court explicitly changed its case-law upon 
the intervener’s request. The Court has overturned Chamber judgments with 
which interveners disagreed. However, whether this was (in part) a consequence 
of the criticism aired by the interveners cannot be established. After all, it happens 
regularly that the Grand Chamber overrules a Chamber.110
109 See section VIII, B, 1.
110 L. R. Glas, op. cit., note 8, p. 351.
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VII. The Court’s References to the Interventions
The Court does normally not refer to the arguments of the intervener in its 
reasoning. It only did so in 9 of the 59 judgments and decisions.111 Sometimes, 
this is not possible because the Court declares inadmissible or strikes a case 
out even before it can address the merits. In other cases, the Court may react 
to the interventions implicitly because it normally reacts to the arguments of 
the respondent state, which are often to some extent comparable to those of the 
intervener.
When the Court does refer to an intervention, it for example mentions the infor-
mation or arguments provided by the intervener.112 It can also refute an admis-
sibility argument made by an intervener, explaining why the case at hand should 
be distinguished from a case on which the intervener relied.113 The Court reacted 
very clearly to the UK’s proposition that the Court’s findings in  Hirst (No.  2) 
should be revisited, in which the Court found a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 
ECHR (right to free elections) on account of the blanket ban on prisoner voting.114 
It held that “[i]t does not appear […] that anything has occurred or changed at 
the European and Convention levels since the Hirst (No. 2) judgment that might 
lend support to the suggestion that the principles set forth in that case should be 
re- examined”.115 The Court also noted the Czech Republic and Poland’s request 
for guidance, but did not give it.116
In one case, the Court relied on information about Cypriot law provided by 
Cyprus to not find a violation in proceedings in Latvia about the enforcement 
of a Cypriot judgment. Based thereon, it concluded that, even though this was 
possibly not the case in theory, the applicant had enjoyed “equivalent protection” 
in the EU legal system in practice. Therefore, the Bosphorus- doctrine applied and 
no violation took place in Latvia.117 Two  concurring judges found this type of 
reasoning “remarkable”,118 also because the majority interpreted a provision of 
domestic law (of a third state), something that is in principle not the Court’s task, 
and because the interpretation did “not seem to have been the subject of adver-
sarial debate before the domestic courts of the respondent State”.119
111 The nine interventions in the Italian length of proceedings cases were counted once.
112 Ruiz Mateos, op. cit., note 81, § 35; Hirst, op. cit., note 55, § 77; Ahorugeze, op. cit., note 56, § 92; Tarakhel, op. cit., 
note 46, §§ 109, 110, 116, 121; Avotiņš, op. cit., note 47, § 98.
113 Al- Dulimi, op. cit., note 42, § 90; See also ibidem, §§ 93, 113.
114 Scoppola, op. cit., note 55, § 78.
115 Ibidem, § 95.
116 See section VI, C, 2; Cocchiarella, op. cit., note 26, § 138; See also Stoll, op. cit., note 45, §§ 114, 126; Saadi, op. cit., 
note 57, §§ 138-141; M.S.S., op. cit., note 46, §§ 338, 355; Nada, op. cit., note 42, § 120; El Haski, op. cit., note 98, § 86; 
Al- Dulimi, op. cit., note 42, § 90.
117 Avotiņš, op. cit., note 47, § 122.
118 Ibidem, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Lemmens and Briede, § 5.
119 Ibidem.
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The examples just discussed do not make it possible to draw any conclusions as 
to how influential the interventions are.120 The mere fact that the Court refers 
to them, does not mean that they have any influence. Furthermore, the Court 
only refers to the interventions in less than fifteen percent of all cases, some-
thing which may lead the states to conclude that they are of little relevance to the 
Court. An exception to the foregoing may be factually orientated interventions, 
as the example of the Cypriot intervention demonstrates, for the information 
provided can have clear consequences for the Court’s findings.121
VIII. Reasons to Intervene
This section gives two types of reasons for states to intervene under Article 36(2) 
ECHR: reasons why states do intervene and reasons why states should intervene. 
These types of reasons can be distinguished from each other in the sense that the 
former are descriptive, giving actual reasons to intervene, based on the previous 
sections and other sources. The latter type of reasons are normative because they 
explain why it is desirable to intervene. The normative reasons are derived from 
inherent features of the Convention system. In spite of the distinction made, it is 
possible that normative reasons play a role in a decision for a state to intervene, 
making it a descriptive reason as well.
A. Why do States Intervene
As was noted in section VI, F, states mostly seem to intervene to prevent the Court 
from finding a violation, as that may mean that it will find a violation in a future 
case against the intervener too,122 for example because the respondent state and 
the intervener both know a certain domestic legal concept or are subject to the 
same piece of EU legislation. Less often, they apparently intervene to demand 
that the Court overrules a judgment with which they disagree. Also, a state may 
want to ask the Court to confirm something or to ask for guidance.
A rather practical reason why Germany intervened in a certain case was that the 
case was originally brought against itself (and two other states). When the case 
against Germany was struck out, its submissions were accepted as third-party 
observations.123 Comparably, when it turned out that an applicant was not an 
Azerbaijani national, Azerbaijan’s submissions under Article  36(1) ECHR were 
interpreted as a request for leave to intervene under the second limb of that 
Article and leave was granted.124
120 See also H.  Ascensio, “L’amicus curiae devant les jurisdictions internationaless”, Rev.  gén.  dr.  intern.  publ., 
vol. 105, no 4, 2001, pp. 897, 922, 925.
121 See also ibidem, p. 922.
122 L. R. Glas, op. cit., note 8, p. 318.
123 Behrami and Saramati, op. cit., note 43, § 65.
124 Joesoebov, op. cit., note 58, § 40.
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The fact that a state is asked to intervene may also play a role. States ask each 
other, something which is facilitated by a list of the e-mail addresses of all govern-
ment agents.125 Further, the Court asked states to intervene to provide specific 
factual information three times.126 Additionally, it invited Malta to intervene in a 
Cypriot case about contempt of court, in response to which Malta provided infor-
mation on relevant Maltese laws.127 This invitation is unique, as the information 
was not directly relevant to the merits of the individual case, whereas this was the 
case for the other interventions. It is not unique in the sense that the Court prob-
ably only asked for factual information; it seems to only ask for this information 
when inviting a state to intervene.
B. Why should States Intervene
1. The Res Interpretata Effect of Judgments
Although Strasbourg judgments are formally only binding upon the respondent 
state,128 it has been proposed that judgments establishing “a new legal principle 
or standard should have a persuasive authority for all states”;129 they have res 
interpretata effect. The Court has not referred to this term, but it has underscored 
the precedential value of its judgments130 and the states seemed to have accepted 
this effect as well.131 Exactly because some judgments are potentially of relevance 
to states other than the respondent state, it is appropriate that they intervene. 
Intervening gives them the opportunity to give input into a judgment to which 
they may have to abide (partially).132 It also creates the possibility to make the 
Court aware of the potential consequences of a judgment for them, something 
which they can do best because they know their own domestic legal systems best 
and because the Court “cannot know all of the laws or other materials that may 
have a bearing on the outcome of a case”.133 Further, by intervening, the judgment 
may be “easier to apply” for the states,134 not only because the Court is better 
informed, but also because the interveners know of relevant pending cases.135
125 L. R. Glas, op. cit., note 8, p. 318.
126 See section VI, A.
127 Kyprianou, op. cit., note 51, § 117.
128 Article 46(2) ECHR.
129 A. Bodnar, “Res Interpretata: Legal Effect of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments for other States 
Than Those Which Were Party to the Proceedings”, in Y. Haeck and E. Brems (eds), Human Rights and Civil Liberties 
in the 21st Century, Dordrecht, Springer, 2014, pp. 223, 224.
130 Ibidem, p.  227; (1st  sect.), Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 7  January 2010 (Appl.  No.  25965/04) (final since 
7 January 2010), § 197.
131 Interlaken Declaration (2010), Action Plan, § 4(c); Brussels Declaration (2015), Action Plan, § B(1)(d).
132 See also A. Lester, “Third-Party Interventions Before the European Court of Human Rights”, in F. Matscher and 
H. Petzold (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension, Cologne, Carl Heymanns, 1988, pp. 341-342; 
L. Hennebel, op. cit., note 3, p. 650.
133 (GC), Hatton and Others v. UK, 8 July 2003 (Appl. No. 36022/97), § 97; N. Bratza, “The Relationship between the 
UK Courts and Strasbourg”, EHRLR, no 5, 2011, pp. 505, 510-511; P. Harvey, op. cit., note 17.
134 CDDH, op. cit., note 8, p. 27.
135 Ibidem.
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2. The Relevance of Diversity
Irrespective of the res interpretata effect of a judgment, knowledge of different 
domestic legal systems, and the societal attitudes within them, can be of relevance 
to deciding a case. The Court has namely formulated the rule that, in principle, 
a lack of consensus, implies a comparably wide margin of appreciation,136 which 
gives the states relatively much discretion to decide how they protect a Conven-
tion right. Interventions can help the Court to establish whether consensus 
indeed exists,137 since the states know their systems best as was noted above.
3. The Importance of Cooperation
Cooperation between the Court and the states is key to the Convention system’s 
effective functioning, because the system is characterised by the lack of final 
power of the former over the latter and by the sharing of responsibilities between 
them. The Court has no final power over the states because it cannot force them 
to execute its judgments if they refuse to do so. Consequently, it cannot rely on 
coercion, but must instead rely on cooperation.138 The sharing of responsibilities 
is characteristic of the system essentially because the states are primarily respon-
sible for the implementation the Convention and the Court has secondary respon-
sibility for ensuring that the states observe that responsibility.139 The protection 
of the Convention rights therefore “requires a collective effort”.140 When respon-
sibilities are shared, it is only logical that cooperation is important too. For the 
states, interventions are a way to cooperate with the Court, by providing it useful 
information (which the Court may not have the resources for to collect) as was 
also outlined above. Further, interventions, when they help inform the Court of 
domestic laws and attitudes and of the consequences of its judgments for the 
states, may contribute to the quality and persuasiveness of its judgments,141 
something which may in turn add to the likelihood that states will cooperate.
4. The Rise of Dialogue
The concept of dialogue has become a central theme in speeches and writings on 
the relationship between the Court and the states parties.142 Dialogue between 
them is, for example, seen as a way to carry out the shared responsibility between 
the Court and the states,143 to achieve better implementation of the Conven-
136 S.H., op. cit., note 54, § 94; Consensus is not the only factor determining the margin of appreciation.
137 L. van den Eynde, op. cit., note 7, p. 274.
138 Ibidem.
139 See also Interlaken Declaration (2010), Declaration, § 3; Brighton Declaration (2012), § 3.
140 N. Bratza, “Solemn Hearing (Speech at the Opening of the Judicial Year in Strasbourg)”, 27 January 2012, p. 2.
141 See also L.  Hennebel, op.  cit., note  3, p.  643; L.  Hodson, op.  cit., note  40, p.  51; N.  Bürli, op.  cit., note  7, 
pp. 136-137.
142 See generally L. R. Glas, “Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights System: inspiration, added-
value and means”, EJHR, no 3, 2015, p. 247.
143 Brighton Declaration (2012), § 12(c).
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tion,144 and to prevent or resolve conflicts.145 The states have limited means to 
formally engage with the Court when they are not a respondent state. Interven-
tions are such a means, which makes it possible to directly write to the Court 
within the context of a specific case in a rather easy manner.146
IX. Recommendations
The previous two sections gave various cogent reasons why states do and should 
intervene. Intervening gives them the opportunity to explain to the Court why, 
for diverse reasons, finding a violation would not be a good idea in their opinion 
or to give relevant factual information. States should use this opportunity 
because the Court’s judgments have res interpretata effect and because a diversity 
of domestic practice can be of relevance to the outcome of a case. Intervening 
moreover permits them to cooperate and to enter into a dialogue with the Court, 
actions which potentially greatly advance the Convention system’s functioning. 
Yet, interventions remain rare and even are a phenomenon that some states never 
encounter. The states are therefore recommended to intervene more often.147
Considering the res interpretata effect of the Court’s judgments, the states are 
encouraged to continue to focus on cases that will probably lead to judgments 
of general importance. They can inform the Court of the consequences which 
a certain ruling may have for its own domestic legal system. Also, they could 
provide relevant information of a factual nature, including relevant domestic 
judgments,148 since asking for such information is a reason for the Court to ask 
states to intervene and because it is a way to cooperate with the Court. According 
to a Registry lawyer, “the most effective [interventions] are those which respect 
the Court’s request to not comment on the merits of a case, those which do not 
seek to advance their own interest and, above all, those which, in good faith, seek 
to provide real assistance to the Court in its adjudicative task”.149 Considering 
that the states do not always respect this request and often seem to advance their 
own interest, they could change the content of their interventions accordingly 
when they really want to cooperate with the Court. Further, because the interven-
144 Committee of Ministers, Annual Report 2011, p. 10.
145 N. Bratza (2011), op. cit., note 133, p. 510; See also J. H. Gerards, “The European Court of Human Rights and 
the National Courts: Giving Shape to the Notion of ‘Shared Responsibility’”, in J. H. Gerards and J. W. A. Fleuren 
(eds), Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the Judgments of the ECtHR in National 
Case-Law. A Comparative Analysis, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2014, pp. 13, 33-34.
146 See also L. R. Glas, op. cit., note 8, p. 358; Also, upon its entry into force, Protocol 16 makes it possible for the 
highest domestic courts – in the states that have ratified the Protocol – to request the Court to give advisory opin-
ions on questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention rights (Article 1(1)). 
This possibility will, according to the preamble of the Protocol, increase the interaction between the Court and the 
national authorities.
147 See also Parliamentary Assembly, “Recommendation on Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]”, 1477(2000), 
28  September 2000, §  3; Venice Commission, “Opinion  209/2002 on the Implementation of Judgments of the 
[ECtHR]”, CDL-AD(2002)34, 18 December 2002, §§ 86-88; Explanatory Report to Protocol 14, § 19; CDDH, “Report 
on Measures Taken by the Member States to Implement relevant Parts of the Interlaken and Izmir Declarations”, 
CM(2012)167, 17 December 2012, §§ 81, 94.
148 P. Harvey, op. cit., note 16; See also H. Ascensio, op. cit., note 120, p. 921.
149 Ibidem.
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tions seem to be mostly reactive to referred Chamber judgments, the states are 
encouraged to be more proactive and to also intervene when the Court has not 
yet decided on a certain issue.
The states can also take measures to stimulate interventions. In light of the 
finding that they have a de facto right to intervene under Article  36(2) ECHR, 
but must formally request leave to intervene, they could amend the Convention. 
The Convention could be amended to turn the de facto right into a de jure right to 
intervene in any (Grand) Chamber case, regardless of whether a state’s national 
is the applicant and as long as its intervention is detached from the case. Thus, 
a procedural barrier would be dismantled, something which possibly stimulates 
interventions. This amendment is also advocated because, considering the res 
interpretata effect, the states have a legitimate interest in the outcome of prin-
cipled judgments.150 More practically, respondent states can ask other states to 
intervene more often and discuss how they can share information about commu-
nicated cases that are suitable for interventions “at the earliest possible stage”, 
for example by means of an online discussion forum.151
In addition to the states, the Court can stimulate interventions. It could invite 
states to intervene more often and, once, they intervene, make the most of their 
dialogue by asking questions to the intervener as it does to the parties.152 The 
Court could further refer to interventions more in its judgments, to demonstrate 
that they are indeed of relevance and to make the intervention process more of 
a dialogue. Additionally, the Court could bring all the cases that are referred to 
the Grand Chamber to the states’ attention with an invitation to intervene and 
use press releases to identify pending cases which may result in principled judg-
ments.153 To make the interventions probably more useful to itself, the Court could 
be stricter in upholding the requirement that the intervener cannot comment on 
the admissibility and merits of the applicant’s case.
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